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Macroprudential regimes and the politics of social
purpose
Andrew Baker
Department of Politics, University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, United Kingdom; Shefﬁeld Political Economy
Research Institute, University of Shefﬁeld, Shefﬁeld, United Kingdom
ABSTRACT
Following the ﬁnancial crash of 2008, many scholars have highlighted ﬂaws and
inadequacies in emerging macroprudential regulatory regimes. A missing ingredient
in the political economy of post-crisis ﬁnancial reform is the neglect of questions of
social purpose in both policy debate and IPE scholarship. Social purpose is deﬁned as
a vision of the desirable or good economic system, derived from combinations of
economic analysis and ethical reasoning. It is of particular relevance and importance
to macroprudential regime building, because the foundational macroprudential
conceptual frameworks developed by the Bank for International Settlements and the
Geneva Group from 2000 onwards display the features of a macrosocial ontology that
draw on a Minsky–Keynes tradition. By focusing on systemic outcomes and collective
social expectations, such an ontology creates the basis for so-called macro-moralities
that provide ethical justiﬁcations for public forms of systemic stabilisation. However, a
variety of epistemological, professional, institutional and political barriers have
impeded relevant expert groups and political actors’ willingness and ability to actively
translate macroprudential ontology into a systemic vision, or sense of social purpose
that could be communicated to the public at large.
KEYWORDS Macroprudential; Ruggie; social purpose; ontology; Minsky; macro-moralities; systemic risk; ﬁnancial
reform
To be precise the most important concern in court politics is access to the mind of the prince.
And if economics is too important to be left to the economists, it is certainly too important to
be left to economist courtiers. Economic issues must become a serious public matter and the
subject of debate if new directions are to be undertaken. Meaningful reforms cannot be put over
by an advisory and administrative elite that is itself the architect of the existing situation. Unless
the public understands the reason for change they will not accept its cost; understanding is the
foundation of legitimacy for reform. (Minsky, 1986, p. 321).
Introduction
How is it that economic ideas that offer critical assessments of ﬁnancial market pathol-
ogies can be applied in ways that effectively maintain those very same processes? Using
the case of the emergence of macroprudential regulation since the ﬁnancial crash of
2008, this article argues that when ideas are not translated into, or accompanied by, a
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clearly articulated sense of the ‘social purpose’ they should serve, they are likely to be
conservative in application. In making this case, the article calls for a renewed and
more explicit focus on the concept and processes of social purpose as a series of interac-
tive discursive and political processes in the study of International Political Economy
(IPE).
After John Ruggie’s seminal 1982 article, which established the conceptual and
empirical importance of social purpose (Ruggie, 1982), the treatment of social purpose
has been implicit, incidental and ﬂeeting in subsequent scholarship, not least because it
remains a slippery concept that was never formally deﬁned.1 Social purpose is deﬁned
here as a systemic vision, which speciﬁes the purpose, function and contribution of the
ﬁnancial system, in wider economic and social terms, derived from combinations of
empirical and normative reasoning, that is communicated publicly and explicitly to
build an inter-subjective consensus concerning appropriate economic goals, principles,
values and activities. Ontology, or accounts of the constituent processes, properties and
relations of economic life, as previous scholarship in this journal has illustrated, provide
foundations for ethical and normative orientation (Best & Widmaier, 2006). Scholars of
IPE can, therefore, place the study of social purpose on a more systematic footing by
investigating how speciﬁc economic ontologies carry within them distinct moral possi-
bilities (Best & Widmaier, 2006, p. 610). The argument advanced here goes beyond
Best and Widmaier’s important contribution to illustrate that normative and moral rea-
soning does not automatically emerge from a given ontology. When that ontology takes
the form of what they call a macrosocial ontology, developing related ‘macro-
moralities’ requires an active process of translation by expert groups and political
actors, communicating a systemic vision, or social purpose derived from that ontology.
In the macroprudential case, this process of translation has not materialised, because a
macrosocial ontology that shares many features with the work of Keynes and Minsky,
has not led to the kind of normative and moral arguments about ﬁnancial reform, that
both of these scholars developed in earlier eras. The article makes this argument and
investigates the reasons why macroprudential ambition and efforts to explicitly connect
it to a sense of social purpose have been so limited.
The limited nature of ﬁnancial reform after the ﬁnancial crash has been the subject
of considerable scholarly debate and attention (Bieling, 2014; Helleiner, 2014; Konings,
2016; Lall, 2012; Pagliari & Young, 2014). The need for macroprudential regulatory
regimes was one of the primary changes identiﬁed by numerous expert groups con-
vened by the ofﬁcial community following the ﬁnancial crash of 2008, and was ofﬁcially
endorsed as a policy priority by the G20 summits during 2009 (Baker, 2013a). It was
seen by some in the policy world to signal a ‘new ideology’, or approach to ﬁnancial
governance (Borio, 2011; Haldane, 2009). Macroprudential policy involves pre-emptive
interventions to minimise the threat of ﬁnancial instability and moderate cyclical risk-
taking across ﬁnancial systems as a whole. It promised a greater role for public authori-
ties in overseeing and framing private decision-making, after two decades of light-touch
oversight based on faith in private risk management techniques. It also emphasised
macro-ﬁnancial instability over equilibrium, while critiquing many of the assumptions
of the efﬁcient market approach and private risk management modelling techniques
such as value at risk (VaR). In this sense, the macroprudential turn has represented a
degree of crisis-induced intellectual change (Baker, 2013a, 2013b; Datz, 2013; Engelen
et al., 2011; Erturk, Froud, Leaver, Moran, & Williams, 2011). However, there is a grow-
ing sense that the ‘macroprudential turn’, despite some degree of intellectual rupture
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with the last three decades, is increasingly constrained and minimal in its ambition,
providing ‘perfect cover’ for a limited reform agenda overlooking distributional con-
cerns and the case for stronger controls on markets (Helleiner, 2014, p. 128). Noted
explanations for macroprudential minimalism include vested ﬁnancial sector interests
diluting macroprudential ambition (Helleiner, 2014); macroprudential as symbolic pol-
itics (Goodhart, 2015; Lombardi & Moschella, 2017); risk management as a form of
neo-liberal governmentality (Konings, 2016); practical difﬁculties in executing macro-
prudential policy instruments (Butzbach, 2016; Stellinga & Mugge, 2017); a techno-
cratic predisposition to incrementalism (Baker, 2013b); and an ambiguous regulatory
philosophy (Cooper, 2011; Helleiner, 2014). While these potential explanations have
varying merits, they all overlook an important element of the emerging political econ-
omy of macroprudential regulation.
To talk meaningfully of a ‘macroprudential perspective’ requires recognising that a
combination of the staff of an international organisation (IO) –The Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) and a group of academic economists consciously developed
and deﬁned a macroprudential conceptual core, or ontology – as a series of claims
about how the ﬁnancial world is constituted by speciﬁc market processes and their
macroeconomic implications. This article identiﬁes a gap between the latent critical
nature of that ontology and the relatively conservative policy activity emerging from it.
More ambitious blue prints and guiding rationales for macroprudential policy are not
emerging. Actors that developed macroprudential ontology (central bankers, staff of
IOs and academic economists) have not pursued wider questions relating to the pur-
pose and objectives of macroprudential regulatory regimes. Efforts at new forms of sys-
temic ﬁnancial governance are, in many national settings, consequently being
conducted with little in the way of a guiding vision of what purpose the overall system,
as the object of regulation, should serve.
The ﬁrst section introduces, deﬁnes and revisits the concept of social purpose. A key
question addressed is how scholars should approach and study social purpose. The sec-
ond section scrutinises macroprudential ontology, through a combination of content
analysis of the two foundational streams of conceptual work (BIS and Geneva Group)
that established a macroprudential perspective, and interviews with some of these early
macroprudential advocates. It establishes that macroprudential ontology displays the
features of a macrosocial ontology, that draws heavily, although often implicitly, on a
Keynes, Kindleberger, Minsky (KKM) tradition (Kirshner, 2014, p. 96). As a macroso-
cial ontology, it emphasises collective outcomes that are more than the sum of their
parts, the limits and ﬂaws of individual private decision-making in a context of uncer-
tainty, and the subsequent role of self-fulﬁlling agent expectations in driving economic
cycles and socially suboptimal ﬁnancial instability (Best & Widmaier, 2006, p. 617).
Crucially, contrary to some claims, evidence is presented to show that this ontology
does contain a theory of endogenous ﬁnancial instability that has a number of similari-
ties to the earlier work of Hyman Minsky (Kregel, 2014). Such a macro-intellectual uni-
verse opens up potential macro-ethical orientations involving a public ethics and a
collective conception of moral responsibility and agency (Best & Widmaier, 2006,
pp. 610–611). The third section identiﬁes that the potential moral and ethical implica-
tions of macroprudential ontology have been neglected by policy-makers, producing a
lack of clarity with regards to the objectives and purposes of macroprudential policy
regimes (Tucker, 2016a). In earlier eras, both Keynes and Minsky developed moral rea-
soning derived from their empirical and conceptual work, recognising this could power
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and legitimate their ideas and was part of the task of economics (Baker & Widmaier,
2014; Widmaier, 2016a, 2016b). In contrast, a combination of professional, epistemo-
logical and institutional factors have made contemporary macroprudentialists reluctant
to move beyond a narrow technical mode of operation (Engelen, Johal, Leaver, Nilsson,
& Williams, 2011, p. 189). Without purposeful actors willing to and capable of, translat-
ing ideas, into a systemic normative vision, their application is likely to result in modest
technical system maintenance and management.
Financial reform, social purpose and ontology
Financial reform projects intended to produce greater degrees of ﬁnancial stability
impose costs on some actors. In the macroprudential case, this involves regulators
potentially constraining the risk-taking activities of private ﬁnancial institutions during
the upswing phase of ﬁnancial cycles in an effort to minimise the costs generated by
episodes of ﬁnancial instability. Current macroprudential tools include leverage limits/
ratios; time-varying capital requirements (e.g. the countercyclical capital buffer in Basel
III); loan-to-value requirements (LTV) and loan-to-income requirements (LTI) on
mortgages; margins and haircuts; and in some Asian countries restrictions on and man-
agement of foreign exchange liabilities and the levying of ‘macroprudential’ taxes. All of
these instruments can affect the terms on which consumers and enterprises can access
credit and conduct ﬁnancial transactions. Such interventions can result in individuals
or institutions perceiving that their capacity to accumulate wealth is being squeezed,
potentially making them unpopular. Several prominent macroprudential advocates
have noted that there is no readymade supportive constituency for such countercyclical
policies (Borio, 2013; Haldane, 2013). The Minsky quote with which this paper begins,
is a recognition of these kinds of costs and emphasises the importance of building pub-
lic understanding and support based on public debate and justiﬁcations for ﬁnancial
reform couched in terms of wider beneﬁts (social purpose). However, clear intelligible
explanations can be difﬁcult to arrive at in an area renowned for its technical complex-
ity. This is where articulations of social purpose by policy-makers can build public sup-
port for ﬁnancial reform projects, but can also guide and inform policy interventions.
Social purpose is deﬁned here as a systemic vision of the good ﬁnancial and eco-
nomic system derived from a combination of analytical and normative reasoning com-
municated through a public discourse, that builds a widely shared intersubjective
consensus (among both government elites and mass publics) concerning the desirabil-
ity and beneﬁts of a given system. Where ﬁnance is concerned, this might entail argu-
ments about the purpose ﬁnance should serve in relation to the wider economy,
including goals such as ecological sustainability, employment generation, or simply the
plentiful, but relatively stable supply of credit and investment opportunities as the basis
of economic efﬁciency. Such a vision will also identify the appropriate role and obliga-
tions of the state, and can involve reaching evaluative judgements on desirable and
undesirable economic and ﬁnancial activity. Social purpose can be thought of as an
ongoing interactive process, in which normative claims and their systemic vision are
advanced, accepted, rejected or modiﬁed by publics and elites.
Future research into social purpose should think in terms of three elements: (1) a
constitutive or content element (the primary focus here) where claims about how eco-
nomic systems function, their problems and how they might be made better are estab-
lished; 2) a communication element – combinations of normative and utilitarian
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discourses that provide explanations and justiﬁcations to the public for broad policy
orientation, articulating a wider systemic vision, derived from the content element; (3)
and a reception element involving public and elite reactions, behaviours and coalition
building, that feeds into, drives and may modify visions of appropriate social purpose.
All three of these elements will interact. The politics of social purpose is the question of
whether agents are able and willing to develop and derive normative interpretations
drawn from prevailing economic accounts, and whether those in turn draw supportive
reactions from broad coalitions. To be functional, social purpose has to evolve into a
widely shared intersubjective consensus (with domestic and international components)
that enables evaluations of the intentionality and appropriateness of state and corporate
agents’ behaviours.2 In the macroprudential case to date, it is argued that movement
from element 1 to element 2 as part of a process of ‘translation’ (Ban, 2016; Campbell,
2004) has been limited (see Figure 1).
Social purpose was referred to on 16 occasions in one of the most inﬂuential and
cited IPE articles of all time (Ruggie, 1982). However, in his seminal piece, John Ruggie
never formally deﬁned the concept and it has only been the subject of somewhat pass-
ing engagement in subsequent scholarship (Muzaka & Bishop, 2015; Ruggie, 2008;
Van Apeldoorn, 2003).3 Ruggie’s account did allude to the fact that social purpose
refers to the normative framework of regimes (Ruggie, 1982, p. 384), relates to the bal-
ance between market and state authority, including how state power was to be
employed in the domestic economy (Ruggie, 1982, p. 386). Financial reform projects
and new ﬁelds of public policy such as macroprudential regulation or policy, which are
in essence about expanding the range of available policy instruments to constrain ﬁnan-
cial market excess (Baker & Widmaier, 2014) are particularly ripe for analysis in terms
of social purpose, precisely because they expand the scope of state intervention and
potentially reconﬁgure the relationship between state and market authority. Moreover,
because macroprudential policy is about system-wide ﬁnancial governance and the
Figure 1. The politics of social purpose.
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management of systemic risk, we can reasonably expect that such an enterprise could
be aided by a systemic vision.
The notion of social purpose as a form of systemic vision is congruent with Ruggie’s
original use of the term. ‘Embedded liberalism’ as described by Ruggie was a form of
normative system governance based on the principle that governments would assume
more responsibility for domestic social security under post-war Bretton Woods
regimes, than under nineteenth-century ‘laissez faire liberalism’. Near-universal
demands for enhanced social protection from across the political spectrum (Ruggie,
1982, p. 287) produced a compromise between domestic stability and an open interna-
tional economy based on ‘appropriate’ domestic interventions to promote welfare and
growth (Ruggie, 1982, p. 393). While Ruggie’s account is relatively light on the norms
and principles at the core of embedded liberalism, he did note that ‘international
regimes provide a permissive environment for the kind of economic transactions that
are complementary to the normative frameworks that have bearing on them’ (Ruggie,
1982, p. 404). Practising social purpose, therefore, requires identifying and encouraging
normatively permissible/desirable and non-desirable types of economic activity and
taking action accordingly. In the macroprudential case, such efforts have been limited.
Public communicative discourses linking macroprudential regulation to normative
visions of the desirable ﬁnancial system are also similarly underdeveloped, internation-
ally, and in most domestic settings.
The literature on ideas in economic governance has recognised the importance of
normative claims. For example, Vivien Schmidt distinguishes between cognitive and
normative ideas, with cognitive ideas, concerning what is and what to do (causal ideas,
maps and recipes for policy action – macroprudential ontology) and normative ideas
reaching judgements about what is good and bad and what one ought to do (Schmidt,
2008, pp. 306–307). John Campbell refers to normative ideas that specify how things
should be (Campbell, 1998), while Seabrooke and Wigan consider how expert profes-
sionals use moral authority to propel ideas with moral force as well as expert analysis
(Seabrooke & Wigan, 2016). Schmidt also considers background philosophical ideas, as
world views, underlying assumptions, values and principles that structure knowledge
in society and are rarely contested except in times of crisis (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306).
More recently, Smith has called for greater attention on the hierarchy of values in the
study of political economy and how they are invoked to either reproduce or change
rules, norms and conventions (Smith, 2017, p. 615). These latter two concepts resemble
social purpose, but social purpose goes beyond individual normative claims, which can
often take the form of pragmatic and inconsistent stories told by elites for instrumental
reasons (Schmidt, 2008, p. 310). Rather social purpose is an interactive process in which
a form of system or macro thinking is derived from a systematic diagnosis of past eco-
nomic performance and involves a concerted effort to convey a desirable systemic
vision derived from that diagnosis. Any given social purpose will, therefore, require
actors who are willing and able to stitch together combinations of compatible cognitive
and normative ideas and communicate a vision of the good and desirable system.
In invoking social purpose, one of Ruggie’s intentions was to encourage scholars
to pay more attention to the content of the international order – its social purpose
(Ruggie, 1982, p. 283). Studying social purpose requires giving due consideration to
how such visions of the good system are formulated and from where they emerge.
In this sense, social purpose can be thought of as a sequential process. To be able to
advance arguments about what is appropriate and desirable, agents need to ﬁrst be able
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to offer a diagnosis of current inter-relations and properties of economic systems (an
ontology) and reach judgements and interpretations based on that analysis (Blyth,
2002). Normative and moral possibilities in economic policy, it has been noted, are
rooted in prevailing ontologies (Best & Widmaier, 2006). One implication of this is
that scholars concerned with the politics of ideas should spend time interrogating eco-
nomic ontologies, deciphering their potential ethical implications and likely political
reception. However, the literature on economic ideas has generally had more to say
about the processes through which ideas become ascendant and the fashion in which
they are used, rather than thorough interrogations of the implications of their content
and claims.4
Claims that ideas have a relational quality, as webs of related elements of meaning,
with different parts of ideas depending closely on one another (Cartsensen, 2011),
imply that a particular ontology and the concepts that comprise it, will have implica-
tions for normative ideas and ethical stances (Schmidt, 2008). A useful starting point in
arriving at a deeper understanding of the content of a given order, therefore, is to give
due attention to the concepts policy-makers employ to provide accounts of complex
systems, including the claims those concepts make, and any normative implications
that may ﬂow from them. Intellectual heritage and lineage matter here because, as
Keynes noted in his famous reference to the inﬂuence of defunct economists (Keynes,
1936, p. 384), many policy actors often draw unwittingly on earlier conceptual frames
and writings, which often contain hidden or deep-rooted normative assumptions about
moral agency and responsibility. Understanding of the politics of social purpose in the
macroprudential case should, therefore, begin with a deeper analysis of macropruden-
tial ontology, its conceptual foundations and its intellectual heritage.
Macroprudential as macrosocial ontology
As Best and Widmaier note, a fundamental ontological distinction in modern eco-
nomic theory is between microeconomics and macroeconomics. Micro-approaches
deploy an ontological individualism based on the rational representative agent, reduc-
ing the social world to the actions of individuals, who are alone capable of exercising
moral responsibility (Best & Widmaier, 2006, pp. 616–617). Accordingly, ‘a methodo-
logical emphasis on micro foundations hardens into a liberal individualist normative
bias’ (p. 610). A macro-ontology, on the other hand, shifts focus to collective outcomes,
advancing beyond aggregation of atomistic individual agents to consider complex
dynamic social systems as autonomous forces that are more than the sum of their parts
(Best & Widmaier, 2006, p. 617). Conceptions of individual wealth and moral responsi-
bility are consequently complicated by acknowledgement of these broader systemic
forces. Macrosocial ontologies follow Keynes in seeing the economy as a social realm
(p. 611), emphasising the role of collective expectations and conventions under condi-
tions of uncertainty (p. 617). With economic policy effectiveness shaped by such
expectations, overarching policy objectives are seen as something appropriately deter-
mined by wider public deliberation (Best & Widmaier, 2006, p. 618). Macrosocial
ontologies in this reading translate into macro-ethical orientations (p. 610), implying a
far more public ethics, with public authorities having an obligation to protect collective
welfare and stabilise ﬁnancial and economic systems (Best & Widmaier, 2006, p. 617).
Such a shift opens up new potential macro-moralities and conceptions of the purpose
of ﬁnance that were previously closed off. However, while actors operating in a micro-
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 299
individualist frame have relatively little to do to assert moral and normative positions
derived from the primacy of the individual in a form of passive translation, macrosocial
ontologies require agents engaging in active intellectual translation, developing expan-
sive normative reasoning, because they depend on the construction of alternative sys-
temic visions and their subsequent communication.
The BIS, the Geneva report and the intellectual heritage of
macroprudential ontology
Central bankers, the staff of the BIS and the academic economists interviewed in the
course of the research for this article, all emphasised that the macroprudential frame
has an eclectic range of intellectual inﬂuences from early monetarism, Irving Fisher’s
debt deﬂation thesis, to Hyman Minsky’s work on ﬁnancial instability (Interview, cen-
tral banker, 27 March 2013, Interview IO staff, 7 February 2013). However, it is possible
to show that the intellectual foundational work that outlined the core concepts that
deﬁned a macroprudential perspective have the features of a macrosocial ontology.
These concepts draw heavily on Minsky’s work on cyclical ﬁnancial instability (even if
this was not always intentional). The nature of these parallels, their roots in Minsky’s
reinterpretation of Keynes, their implications and signiﬁcance have received only lim-
ited consideration to date (Barwell, 2013, p. 26; Esen & Binatli, 2012; Kregel, 2008;
Papadimitriou & Wray, 2010, p. 129). The rediscovery of Minsky, given his previously
marginal status and reputation as a voice for radical reform of capitalism, certainly war-
rants closer inspection in terms of its political implications as well as its intellectual
ones.
While macroprudential knowledge continues to evolve, the deﬁning conceptual core
of a macroprudential perspective was established by two work streams that produced a
range of papers from the early 2000s onwards. The ﬁrst of these was the in-house work
of BIS staff. Two speeches by General Manager Andrew Crockett were used to justify a
macroprudential research agenda in the aftermath of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, with
BIS staff laying some claim to having invented ‘macroprudential’ (Crockett, 2000;
Conﬁdential interviews, 7 February 2013, 28 October 2013; Clement, 2010; Galati &
Moessner, 2013). The BIS is an IO that provides data, analytical, research and informa-
tion services for its member central banks (Seabrooke, 2006). A second stream of aca-
demic work was undertaken by the Financial Markets Group at the London School of
Economics (LSE), with BIS staff themselves approvingly referring to an ‘LSE endogene-
ity school of risk’ (Borio, 2003, p. 8; Danielsson et al., 2001; Danıelsson, Shin, &
Zigrand, 2004; Goodhart & Danielsson, 2001). Three primary academics associated
with this emerging school, Charles Goodhart, Markus Brunnermeir and Hyun
Shin, were all well networked in the central banking world and later teamed up with
Crockett, and markets analyst and investor Avinash Persaud to produce the Geneva
Report (Brunnemeier, Crockett, Goodhart, Persaud, & Shin, 2009). One senior Bank of
England ofﬁcial recalled that this was the most intellectually substantial of the many
post-crisis reports and did most to establish a macroprudential frame in the central
banking community (Conﬁdential Interview, Bank of England Ofﬁcial, March 2014).
While numerous post-crisis reports referenced and called for macroprudential regula-
tion (Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2014), it was these two streams of longer-standing work
that established conceptually what the macroprudential frame consisted of and con-
sciously developed a macroprudential ontology. As one BIS ofﬁcial noted: ‘most of the
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intellectual push for macroprudential came from BIS staff and UK based academics,
some of whom later went to the US’ (Shin and Brunnermeier moved to Princeton (Cor-
respondence from IO ofﬁcial, March 2012).
Fallacies of composition
Both the BIS work and the Geneva report start by identifying fallacies of composition
(FOC) to highlight how ﬁnancial systems are more than the sum of their parts. Identi-
fying a problem for regulators adopting a micro-lens, the Geneva Report noted a fallacy
of composition arises when ‘one infers that something is true for the whole from the
fact that it is true for each of the individual components of the whole’ (Brunnemeier
et al., 2009, p. 75). In the BIS reading, ﬁnancial crises were not random events, or acci-
dents, ‘but the outcome of systemic distortions in perceptions of risk, resulting from fal-
lacies of composition’ (Borio, 2011, p. 2). Likewise, the Geneva Report noted that ‘by
trying to make themselves safer, highly leveraged ﬁnancial intermediaries, can behave
in ways that collectively undermine the system’ (Brunnemeier et al., 2009, p. xi). In this
respect, fallacy of composition identiﬁes the problem of asserting systemic properties
by extrapolating from individual ones. It was used to highlight the knowledge deﬁcits
faced by both regulators and market participants adopting a micro-lens and the limits
of focusing on individual actions as the basis for systemic outcomes.
Both streams of work constructed ﬁnancial regulation as a macroeconomic issue.
The Geneva Report opened by explicitly stating, ‘in our view (macro)economic analysis
and insight has, in the past, been insufﬁciently applied to the design of ﬁnancial regula-
tion. Our purpose is to rectify that lacunae’ (Brunnemeier et al., 2009, p. xi). Likewise,
the BIS noted that ﬁnancial regulators (with the exception of central banks) lacked the
know-how to factor macroeconomic or market-wide considerations into their deci-
sion-making (Borio, 2011, p. 13). In the Geneva Report, one of the key critiques of
existing regulatory practice such as the earlier Basel agreements was that they essen-
tially sought to agree and harmonise best practice, without much attempt to ‘rationalise
them against principles of underlying (macroeconomic) theory’ (Brunnemeier et al.,
2009, p. 1). Earlier BIS writing had claimed the ‘macroprudential perspective’ fell
squarely within the ‘macroeconomic tradition’, because it viewed ﬁnancial distress in
terms of its impact on economic output as a whole, rather than individual institutions
(Borio, 2003, p. 2).
FOC were used to place an ontological premium on collective systemic outcomes,
while stressing the limitations of individual preferences in producing ‘equilibria’ (Ferri
& Minsky, 1992). In this respect, it followed Keynes observation that:
it is not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that enlightened self-interest
always operates in the public interest. Nor is it true that self-interest generally is enlightened.
More often individuals acting separately to promote their own ends are too ignorant, or too
weak to attain even these. (Keynes, 1931, pp. 287–288, quoted in Minsky, 1975, p. 147)
This analytical focus on potential suboptimal collective outcomes moved beyond ‘the
atomistic and individualist ontology’ of microeconomics (Best & Widmaier, 2006,
p. 615), and established that concern with a broader ‘collective public interest’ was legit-
imate. It also highlighted the uncertainty facing agents in the ﬁnancial system when
applying an individualist calculative lens. Fallacy of composition, in this sense, put the
‘macro’ into macroprudential. It effectively made a case, both analytically and ethically
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(though more implicitly), for public authorities using a system-wide vantage point and
macro-techniques to produce better collective market outcomes in the name of a wider
collective interest. Such a collective macro-ontology, therefore, opens up questions of
appropriate systemic vision as the basis for public action, in ways that have largely
been closed off by micro-ontologies.
Endogeneity
A second distinctive feature of macroprudential ontology emphasised in both BIS
and Geneva group accounts identiﬁed the endogenous sources of ﬁnancial risk and
instability. Pre-crash, ﬁnancial instability was largely conceived of as a function of
exogenous shocks from outside of the system. The endogenous focus of macropru-
dential ontology shifted the analytical lens towards the ‘collective behaviours, deci-
sions, risk perceptions and reactions of market participants (banks and ﬁnancial
institutions)’ (Borio, 2003, pp. 3, 5; Brunnemeier et al., 2009, pp. xv–xvi, 5, 25, 63).
The BIS approvingly noted an emerging LSE endogeneity school of risk (Borio,
2003, p. 8; Danielsson et al., 2001; Goodhart & Danielsson, 2001) that focused atten-
tion on ﬁnancial institutions’ management of balance sheet exposures as a cause of
ﬁnancial instability (Borio, 2003, p. 16). An endogenous perspective on ﬁnancial
instability was developed at some length by Minsky, who emphasised the impor-
tance of ‘beginning one’s theorizing about capitalist economies with interlocking
balance sheets’ (Minsky, 1995, p. 202). Rather than a benign view of market condi-
tions forcing powerless agents to serve a social good (Ferri & Minsky, 1992, p. 9, fn.
14), Minsky highlighted how the proﬁt-maximising, cost-minimising and portfolio
preferences of banks could lead to short-term ﬁnancing, increasing debt-to-equity
ratios, resulting in increased systemic ﬁnancial fragility (Minsky, 1995, p. 203). Both
the BIS and Geneva group authors noted that market actors have incentives to react
to risk in ways that are socially suboptimal (Abbreu & Brunnermeier, 2003; Borio,
Furﬁne, & Lowe, 2001, p. 1; Brunnermeier & Nagel, 2004), with the Geneva report
identifying size, interconnectedness with the rest of the system, degree of leverage
and the role of prices in contemporary private risk models in ‘intensifying endoge-
nous volatility’ (Brunnemeier et al., 2009, p. XVI).
An ontology of endogenous ﬁnancial instability allows for more critical readings of
private market investment techniques, strategies and business models. It also effectively
diagnoses ﬁnancial instability as a natural outcome of ﬁnancing processes and the
incentives of market agents. Minsky used his endogenous approach to make the case
for authorities developing evolving ‘thwarting mechanisms’ to contain market instabil-
ity (Ferri & Minsky, 1992, p. 24). Similarly, the endogenous focus of macroprudential
ontology identiﬁes how private decisions can pose threats to broader collective public
welfare, with the implication that ‘respect for private freedoms should always be
balanced against a broader sense of public interests’ (Best & Widmaier, 2006, p. 614).
This broad acknowledgement, however, raises the question of what better collective
outcomes look like, or how a collective public good should be deﬁned in systemic
terms. It also suggests a need for certain investment techniques, behaviours
and ﬁnancial products to be evaluated for their systemic contribution to any such wider
collective public good.
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Procyclicality
Procyclicality is in many respects the deﬁning feature of macroprudential ontology.
It is identiﬁed as the market process that produces an inherent and endemic ﬁnancial
instability. Some BIS staff view it as the primary ﬁnancial market feature to be mitigated
by macroprudential policy. Their analytical work in the 2000s was primarily driven by
an effort to deepen understanding of procyclicality, after several central bankers had
observed the term was little understood (Conﬁdential interview, February 2014, Borio
et al., 2001). The BIS refer to procyclicality as a ﬁnancial accelerator effect ﬁrst identi-
ﬁed by Irving Fisher (1933), but also explored by Kindleberger and Minsky (Borio,
2003, p. 6). It involves risk being underestimated by the market as a whole in booms
and overestimated in recessions, with ﬁnancial trading activities having an amplifying
effect (Borio et al., 2001, p. 1). As an asset price goes up, the Geneva report explains,
demand for it also rises because its risk drops, further accentuating its price level, lead-
ing to procyclical increases in leverage, further driving the cycle, with the same cycle
operating in reverse, when prices fall (Brunnemeier et al., 2009, pp. 16–17). The BIS
account presents procyclicality as a function of a time dimension – the question of how
perceptions of risk change over time (Borio, 2011). Financial market participants have
difﬁculty in calculating the time dimension of risk, because short-time horizons pro-
duce extrapolations of current conditions into the future resulting in misperceptions of
risk (Borio et al., 2001, p. 2). The Geneva report also noted how market actors do not
have long enough time horizons (Brunnemeier et al., 2009, p. 33). Earlier iterations of
the time dimension of procyclicality were evident in Minsky’s observation that ﬁnancial
liquidity was not an innate attribute, but rather was a ‘time related characteristic of an
ongoing (collective) economic intuition’ (Minsky, 1967, p. 1). Keynes similarly
observed that ﬁnancial markets revolved around expectations, so that investment levels
were shaped by moods and expectations about the future (Keynes, 1936, p. 30; Palan,
2015, p. 370).
In this respect, the collective social features of macroprudential ontology come to the
fore in accounts of procyclicality and associated behavioural patterns of herding – a
phenomenon mentioned 11 times in the Geneva report (Borio, 2003, p. 8; Brunnemeier
et al., 2009, p. 39). One Geneva group author explained that herding involves banks
and institutions buying and selling what others are buying and selling, because ‘in a
world of uncertainty the best way to exploit others’ information is to copy what they
are doing’ (Persaud, 2000, p. 3). In this sense, the concept of procyclicality and the
behaviours associated with it follow a Keynes–Minsky tradition that sees investors
wrestling with complex unknowable factors, making calculations drawn from samples
of past and present market data limited guides to the future (Keynes, 1936, pp.156–
158; Kirshner, 2014, p. 47; Palan, 2015, p. 381). A cycle of collective optimism about
the future generates more credit and leverage in expectation of future earnings, but
changes in mood lead to the opposite process, with collective pessimism about future
earnings leading to contractions in available credit and collateral, lower volumes of
trading, lower liquidity and falling asset prices, as wealth literally vanishes (Palan, 2015,
p. 378).
Macroprudential ontology consequently places a heavy emphasis on collective social
processes and conventions as drivers of market cycles and performance (Best &
Widmaier, 2006; Nelson & Katzenstein, 2014). In the IPE literature, this has been
referred to as the ‘reﬂexivity of ﬁnance’, meaning that valuations have little solid anchor
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outside of market participants’ assessments, with such valuation techniques not just
estimating risks, but also shaping market movements by guiding market participants’
decisions (Mackenzie, 2008; Stellinga & Mugge, 2017, p. 394). Echoes of this position
are to be found in the Geneva Report’s critical assessment of VaR modelling where
‘risk measures are estimated naively using past data’ and where risk measures force
either ﬁre sales, or encourage procyclical expansions in leverage (Brunnemeier et al.,
2009, p. 22). More recent macroprudential work has expressed this in terms of the dis-
tinction between risk and ‘knightian uncertainty’, when risks become unknowable,
making complex modelling and institutions own VaR models less effective as guides
for estimating banks’ capital requirements, than simple heuristic indicators such as
leverage ratios (Aikman et al., 2014; Haldane & Modouros, 2012). Socially driven cycles
of ﬁnancial instability are also explored in the BIS concept of ‘the paradox of ﬁnancial
instability’ (Borio, 2011; Borio & Drehmann, 2009). This concept suggests that when
the system looks strongest to most actors, it is at its most vulnerable, because market
agents have the conﬁdence to expand risk-taking and leverage due to low measured
risk, with ‘success breeding a disregard of failure’ (Borio, 2011, p. 7; Minsky, 1986,
p. 237). In this reading, individual decisions become part of a wider expectation-driven
cyclical social process, producing unstable collective systemic outcomes. Again, the
appropriate systemic stabilising role of public authorities, their role in mitigating such
cycles, in discouraging and encouraging certain types of ﬁnancial activity, and the
broader question of how much stability is desirable are brought into view by macropru-
dential ontology.
Complexity
Complexity is a ﬁnal notable element of macroprudential ontology. The BIS sees com-
plexity as a cross-sectional dimension of risk (contrasting with the time dimension of
procyclicality) – how risk is allocated across the ﬁnancial system at a given point in
time. They call for analyses of interlinkages to allow calculation of what each institution
should pay for the systemic risk externality it imposes on the system (Borio, 2011, p. 3).
The Geneva report similarly made the case for a greater focus on the ‘asset liability
structure’ of institutions, because of the risk spillovers from one institution to the next,
proposing spillover measures such as ‘CoVar’ to better capture the links across several
institutions (Brunnemeier et al., 2009, p. 25). Complexity has an ambiguous and mixed
intellectual heritage in ﬁnance. Minsky provided an account of how a euphoric econ-
omy produced a rapid complex layering of ﬁnancial obligations (Minsky, 1970, p. 51).
In such a layered structure, obligations could come to outstrip income receipts (Min-
sky, 1970, p. 54), with ‘the interdependence of payments commitments and position
making across units and institutions’, meaning that the inability of one unit to meet
payments would restrict the ability of recipient units to meet their payment obligations
(Minsky & Campbell, 1987, p. 255). Other authors have noted how Hayek used a vari-
ety of complexity theory to argue that a spontaneous order of a natural pricing system
could not be regulated, or foreseen with any precision (Cooper, 2011, p. 376; von
Hayek, 1974). The complexity narrative has brought consideration of how to make
ﬁnancial regulation and structures simpler through segmentation arrangements (ﬁre
walls and so-called ring fencing) (Aikman et al., 2014; Haldane & Madouros, 2012;
Haldane & May, 2011). Such rationales are likely to have limited public resonance,
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however, without a sense of the overall purpose and functions of the ﬁnancial system
that can be communicated publicly.
The policy neglect of social purpose?
The macroprudential perspective consequently has many of the features of a macroso-
cial ontology. Its focus on collective and systemic outcomes repeatedly raises questions
of the collective good, the wider vision of the good ﬁnancial system, its function and
purpose, and desirable degrees of stability. However, such questions have by and large
remained unanswered and neglected in macroprudential debates. Writing in 2016, for-
mer deputy governor of the Bank of England, Paul Tucker, lamented a lack of consider-
ation given to the objectives and purpose of macro-ﬁnancial stability regimes and
worried about the lack of public debate. He called for less papers on the effectiveness of
various instruments – the default mind and skill set of macro-policy researchers – and
more focus on objectives, purpose and the question of what macroprudential policy is
for (Tucker, 2016a, p. 6, 51, 2016b, 2017).
The neglect of macroprudential social purpose owes much to Best and Widmaier’s
distinction between micro- and macro-ontologies and their implications for normative
possibilities, particularly so-called ‘macro-moralities’. In this respect, micro- and
macro-ontologies create and limit ethical possibilities in distinct ways. For example, the
liberal individualist normative bias, referred to by Best and Widmaier, limits ethical
possibilities through a reductionist logic that claims only individuals have moral
responsibilities. Former IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus’s normative case
for orderly capital account liberalisation simply highlighted beneﬁts accruing to indi-
viduals in terms of freedom and liberty (Best & Widmaier, 2006, pp. 610, 625–626;
Blustein, 2001, pp. 49–50; Camdessus, 1999). Liberal individualist normative arguments
do not require an especially expansive moral vision. Little imagination is necessary to
translate their ontological claims into moral ones, because there is a restricted sense of
a collective good. This is in stark contrast to macrosocial ontologies. An ontological
focus on systemic dynamics and good collective outcomes means that so-called macro-
moralities require an active process of intellectual translation in which a principled sys-
temic vision is articulated. This requires the exercise of substantial, analytical and nor-
mative imagination and creativity. Macro-ontologies do open up a wider range of
moral possibilities, but they also require heavy intellectual lifting to interrogate what
the normative and ethical implications of a given macro-ontology may be and to posi-
tion them in public debate.
Thinking about this in terms of the politics of social purpose and three phases or ele-
ments of social purpose is instructive. Moving beyond a macrosocial ontology requires
agents willing to, and capable of, translating ontology as constitutive element 1, into a
communicative element 2, by acting as active normative agents as well as reﬂexive ana-
lytical ones. In this regard, macroprudential regime development, appears to be beset
by a barrier or blockage that limits attention to questions of purpose (see Figure 1).
The barrier or blockage inhibiting public debate about macroprudential purpose
is partly a function of the way contemporary economic governance and knowledge
production is delegated and segmented into ﬁelds of expertise and institutional settings
that draw boundaries around speciﬁc tasks, skill sets and patterns of thought
(Seabrooke & Henriksen, 2017).5 In both academic macroeconomics and central bank-
ing, patterns of scientisation, involving formal analysis, mathematical abstraction and
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technical mastery have been evident (Marcussen, 2006). Such a professional culture
creates signiﬁcant institutional and professional disincentives to the adoption of the
kind of explicit, expansive normative reasoning required to develop and communicate
macro-moralities and social purpose as a systemic vision.
BIS and Geneva Group authors may have drawn upon many of Minsky’s ideas and
ended up constructing a very similar macrosocial ontology, but here similarities end. In
this respect, contrasting the intellectual steps Minsky took after developing his endoge-
nous cyclical ﬁnancial instability ontology with those of contemporary macroprudential
intellectuals can help to illuminate the nature of the translation barrier in the macro-
prudential policy ﬁeld. Minsky moved freely between ﬁnancial system theory, the
authoring of ﬁnancial reform proposals for the Federal Reserve and more normative
arguments intended to inﬂuence public debate and sentiment.6 He also actively linked
the purpose and objectives of ﬁnancial reform to broader macroeconomic priorities
and questions of social justice. A theory of the ﬁnancial system was viewed as a ‘prior
for action’ (Minsky, 1991, p. 1). Reform proposals had to ‘begin with an acknowledge-
ment that ﬁnancing processes introduced endogenous destabilising forces not well
suited to accommodating specialised long lived, expensive capital assets’ (Minsky,
1986, p. 320). From this position, Minsky came to a view that the proper role of the
ﬁnancial system was to promote the ‘capital development’ of the economy, broadly
interpreted as a ﬁnancial structure that improved living standards through job creation
(Wray, 2011). The appropriate purpose of ﬁnancial regulation was identiﬁed as (full)
employment (primary), price stability and greater equality, with all three intercon-
nected, and best delivered through mechanisms that rigged markets’ (Minsky, 1986,
p. 326). In making this argument, both diagnostic and normative forms of reasoning
were utilised.
No agreement with the orientation of Minsky’s prescriptions is needed to recognise
the intellectual steps he is taking. In the ﬁrst half of Stabilizing an Unstable Economy,
Minsky developed a ﬁnancial instability ontology. In the second half of the book, he
used that theory to generate a systemic vision of the desirable ﬁnancial system – a sense
of ﬁnancial social purpose, where ﬁnancial regulation was linked to other broader desir-
able macroeconomic goals (Minsky, 1986). In his reinterpretation of Keynes’ General
Theory, his closing exploration of social philosophy makes an ethical case for economic
policy objectives focused on employment generation and a more equal distribution of
income, including limiting income from existing wealth, so that economic efﬁciency
became ‘a hand maiden of social justice and individual liberty’ (Minsky, 1975, pp. 148–
152). In Minsky’s own terms, ﬁnancial reform could not follow piecemeal approaches
and patchwork changes, but had to follow a ‘thorough integrated approach’ that ‘must
range over the entire economic landscape and ﬁt the pieces together in a consistent,
workable way’ (Minsky, 1986, p. 323). In a world of ‘reﬂexive ﬁnance’ (as at least par-
tially acknowledged by macroprudential ontology), efforts to ﬁne-tune price distortions
through risk-based adjustments to capital requirements become problematic (Stellinga
& Mugge, 2017). In this context, the case for ‘regulators emphasizing how ﬁnancial
governance has a direct bearing on a range of broader societal domains, and designing
rules with an eye to substantive policy goals in those’ becomes much stronger (Mugge
& Perry, 2014, p. 20).
For Minsky, the good ﬁnancial system required ‘central banks being more hands on
in guiding the evolution of ﬁnancial institutions’, ‘favouring and encouraging long
term stability enhancing activities, over short-term speculative rentier activities and
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discouraging instability augmenting institutions and practices’ (Minsky, 1986, p. 349).
Such an approach would involve reaching judgements on the social worth, or other-
wise, of various ﬁnancial activities and products – the overall risks they generate,
whether they have a long-term orientation, as well as the contributions they make to
other economic objectives such as employment generation, sustainable infrastructure
and technological development, for example. In other words, regulation would be
driven by a vision, or conception of the social purpose of ﬁnance that would inform a
constant evaluation of market products and processes (Kregel, 2014), including judge-
ments on whether they induce instability, with such activities accordingly disincenti-
vised through the levying of penalties, using combinations of taxes and or capital
requirements.
Despite sharing much of Minsky’s diagnosis of processes of ﬁnancial instability, con-
temporary macroprudential intellectuals have not followed Minsky in his second step
of using that ontology to generate arguments about the appropriate social purpose of
ﬁnance, or in linking regulation to other broader desirable economic objectives. In
short, the post-crisis rediscovery of Minsky in ﬁnancial regulatory circles has been
marked by a reluctance to follow in his prescriptive footsteps. This is a pattern that is
particularly evident in the use of macroprudential language. The terms rentier and
speculation, referring to socially and economically corrosive forms of short-term proﬁt-
eering and wealth extraction, were central to Minsky and Keynes’ conceptions of capi-
talist dysfunction, as the primary activities to be identiﬁed and curtailed by public
policy interventions. However, such pejoratives are conspicuous by their absence in
contemporary macroprudential documentation.
Neither term made an appearance in the 98-page Geneva Group report. In 354
documents on the BIS website with macroprudential in the title, ranging from central
bankers’ speeches, working and conference papers by academics, central bankers and
IO staff, policy notes, and joint reports from the Financial Stability Board (FSB), IMF
and BIS to the G20, the term rentierism or rentier made not a single appearance. ‘Spec-
ulative’ or ‘speculation’ appeared in 36 documents, just 10.1%. Only 12 of those papers
went beyond a passing single incidental reference, just 3.95%. A further eight docu-
ments simply used the term to describe current practice in emerging countries, where
curbing speculative or short-term investments in housing, and currency markets are
stated as objectives of macroprudential policy in the cases of Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Singapore, Brazil, South Korea, Peru, China, Colombia, Thailand and Turkey (Arslan
& Upper, 2017; Lim et al., 2011). This left only two outlier papers that discussed mak-
ing the identiﬁcation and curbing of ‘speculative’ activity an objective of macropruden-
tial regime building. The ﬁrst was a discussion paper under the auspices of the
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS), chaired by Jose Manuel Gonzalez
Paramo of the European Central Bank, which suggested the use of qualitative evalua-
tions of ﬁnancial activities to assess whether they were speculative (CGFS, 2012, pp. 15–
16). A second academic paper by MIT Researchers, building on the work of Brunner-
meier on optimism and leverage cycles, presented at the Bank of England, considered
the demand beneﬁts of using macroprudential policies to constrain optimistic and pes-
simistic speculation (Caballero & Simsek, 2017). Nevertheless, the thwarting of specula-
tive ﬁnancial practices, despite being referenced in name in some emerging markets’
institutional arrangements, has remained marginal to contemporary macroprudential
debate and transnational knowledge construction to date.
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The barriers to translating macroprudential ontology into a systemic vision that
draws on normative as well as empirical reasoning are simultaneously epistemological,
professional and institutional. For example, one Geneva group author expresses reser-
vations about seeking to differentiate and isolate socially useless (speculative) from
socially valuable ﬁnance, because it is difﬁcult to distinguish pure position taking, from
operations on behalf of clients, or normal day-to-day ﬁnancing functions, without jeop-
ardising the efﬁcient functioning of complex ﬁnancial markets (Goodhart, 2011). Since
2009, intellectual activity for Geneva group authors has focused on modelling interac-
tions between optimism and leverage cycles, in an effort to mathematically formalise
Minsky’s ﬁnancial instability hypothesis (Bhattacharya, Goodhart, Tsomocos, &
Vardoulakis, 2015; Brunnermeier & Oehmke, 2012).7 But these authors have not fol-
lowed in Minsky’s footsteps when it comes to considering how ﬁnancial regulation
could be linked to wider economic policy objectives. The main macroprudential focus
for BIS staff since the crisis has been the collection and quarterly publication of credit–
GDP gap statistics for 44 countries reaching back to 1961. The Basel III agreement uses
the gap between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend as a guide for inform-
ing the operation of countercyclical capital buffers, at the instigation of BIS ofﬁcials in
earlier negotiations (Drehmann & Tsataronis, 2014; Conﬁdential interview BIS ofﬁcial,
8 February 2013). In short, as Paul Tucker has noted, the focus of professionals in the
macroprudential policy ﬁeld has been on data, model development and indicators at
the expense of wider objectives (Tucker, 2016a, p. 6).
The picture is further conﬁrmed by a recent citation analysis of both policy and aca-
demic papers on ‘systemic risk’ that shows authors remain almost entirely wedded to
formal mathematic modelling, potentially excluding observable phenomenon that can-
not be accommodated in such models (Thiemann, Aldgewy, & Ibrocevic, 2017, p. 21).
Professional skill sets are similarly leading to the triumph of ‘bland reformism’ over
‘strong interventionism’ in shadow banking – an area with implications for systemic
risk (Ban, Seabrooke, & Freitas, 2017). Ofﬁcial debates have ‘neither lionized shadow
banking, nor treated it as dysfunctional villain’, but maintained a detached perspective,
with the FSB engaged in data collection and measurement, the BIS working on the
extension of conventional banking regulatory standards (Basel III) and the IMF devel-
oping notions of conditionality attached to market backstopping for ﬁscal reasons
(Ban, Seabrooke, & Freitas, 2017, p. 1022). In this respect, macroprudential ontology is
a predominantly central banking and academic economists’ framework of understand-
ing. The authority of both groups rests on claims to expertise and mastery of technique
to generate policy solutions. There are strong peer group incentives to stay within such
boundaries, while moving beyond technical work based on mathematical prowess car-
ries the risk of eroding professional status and esteem in peer groups (Baker, 2017).
There is also a strong institutional element to contemporary macroprudential poli-
tics that revolves around the act of delegation and the relationships between delegators
(elected legislators) and delegated (independent agencies such as central banks staffed
by unelected technocrats) (Lombardi & Moschella, 2017; Tucker, 2016a). Delegation is
intended to insulate technical decision-making and institute a supposedly non-political
realm. Tucker, for example, considers the limits to ‘legitimate delegation to indepen-
dent agencies’, warning against tasking them with discretionary interventions that have
distributional effects on households and businesses (Tucker, 2016a). Such conceptions
of delegation also construct boundaries around the kinds of things experts can do, but
also the forms of public reasoning they can deploy and engage in. A point made by
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several central bank ofﬁcials in interviews was that the main priority in macropruden-
tial regime building was to establish a ﬁnancial stability equivalent of inﬂation target-
ing, identifying a clear target to be addressed by speciﬁc instruments (Conﬁdential
interviews, 15 December 2013, 8 February 2014, 27 March 2014). One central banker,
who favoured an activist and expansive approach to ﬁnancial cycle management
reﬂected that he ‘could never win a normative argument, but could generate good data
and analysis, creating compelling rationales to inform wider societal debate’ (Conﬁden-
tial interview, 27 March 2014).
In contemporary economic governance, ‘goals’ are increasingly viewed as the pre-
serve of legislators and or ﬁnance ministries, but these actors have generally paid little
attention to questions of ‘how much stability and stability of what’ (Tucker, 2016a, pp.
5, 51, 2016b). The interest ﬁnance ministries, governments, politicians and wider civil
society actors take in the design, objectives and purpose of ﬁnancial stability regimes
varies by country. However, even in most of the emerging economies that have a stated
intent to use macroprudential policy to stem speculative activities, there is relatively
little evidence of well-developed public communicative discourses. In the advanced G7
countries, debate about the appropriate social purpose of macroprudential regimes has
been even more muted. In the UK, HM Treasury has only made one contribution on
the institutional design of the Bank of England’s new ﬁnancial policy committee (HM
Treasury, 2011), but has published few other macroprudential public documents and
lacks expertise in the area.
The countries that most clearly buck this trend of neglecting macroprudential social
purpose are Brazil and South Korea. Brazil had a number of ofﬁcials who sympathised
with a Minskian developmental perspective, while South Korea practised a form of
‘macroprudential jujitsu’ (Gallagher, 2018, pp. 106, 110). In South Korea, ﬁnance min-
ister Yoon Jeung-Hyun urged a rethink of the function of the ﬁnancial system to beneﬁt
the real economy to enable capital to ﬂow into ‘productive use’. This has been accom-
panied by government criticism of banks for dividend payments, rather than support-
ing local ﬁrms in a form of moral suasion designed to shape public expectations
concerning the appropriate purpose of ﬁnance (Thurbon, 2016, p. 120). Such argu-
ments chimed with a long-standing ‘developmental mindset’ (Thurbon, 2016), in South
Korea, that as in the Brazilian case, had parallels with Minsky’s argument about the
purpose of ﬁnancial governance being to facilitate the capital development of an econ-
omy. South Korea also has integrated policy-making and co-ordination mechanisms
facilitating ‘developmentalism’ that displayed less reliance on contemporary notions of
delegation, as the ﬁnance ministry worked closely with the central bank and was the
dominant macroprudential agency. Moreover, in the South Korea case, it was possible
to connect technical macroprudential knowledge to a sense of social purpose by engag-
ing the services of Geneva group author Hyun Shinn as presidential advisor. Experi-
mentation with new forms of capital controls, foreign exchange interventions,
and taxes on banks dollar denominated debt based on Shin’s advice to President Lee
were headlined as macroprudential measures to encourage funds towards ‘productive
activities’ (Thurbon, 2016, pp. 118–121).
Despite these exceptions, Tucker’s lament about the neglect of the question of what
macroprudential policy is for (Tucker, 2016a, 2016b, 2017) reﬂects a deep-rooted
knowledge–authority asymmetry. Agents with the moral and political authority (the
executive branches of government and legislators) to make arguments about the desir-
able purpose of ﬁnance and the objectives of macro-ﬁnancial regulations have generally
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lacked conceptual and empirical understanding of cyclical endogenous ﬁnancial insta-
bility, or the capacity to draw out the implications of that for a systemic vision of the
purpose of ﬁnance. Agents with knowledge of macroprudential ontology, largely central
bankers and macroeconomists, lack the political authority and have few professional
and institutional incentives to make public arguments about the purpose of ﬁnance.
Instead, their focus has been on technical activities and tasks. Communication between
the two groups has also been constrained by contemporary delegation arrangements
and professional identities, while South Korean and Brazilian approaches have made
little headway internationally, as evident in the limited consideration of speculation in
macroprudential transnational knowledge construction. Some authors have conse-
quently highlighted how macroprudential policy reinforces and represents a continua-
tion of neo-liberal governance practices (Casey, 2015; Konings, 2016), with central
banks using the systemic risk frame to protect the transmission mechanisms of the
ﬁnancial system, rather than pursue restrictive regulation of the ﬁnancial sector
(Konings, 2016, p. 16). However, it is difﬁcult to show this is part of a concerted strate-
gic effort by elites, because there have been so few attempts to publicly communicate
this as a form of explicit macroprudential purpose. Indeed, abstaining on questions
of social purpose has been effective in producing such an outcome to date, although
recognition of the need to be clearer in communicating macroprudential objectives are
starting to grow (Patel, 2017; Skingsley 2016; Tucker, 2016a).
The macroprudential knowledge–authority asymmetry, referred to above, has cre-
ated a void into which chair of the US-based Systemic Risk council (a group of former
regulatory professionals with the stated of intent of preventing post-crisis regulatory
backsliding), and former Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, Paul Tucker, has
stepped. In sketching a vision of social purpose, Tucker’s preferred option is to make
macroprudential ‘safe for central bankers’, by agreeing an international standard of
resilience involving the maintenance of core ﬁnancial services, based on a conception
of the ﬁnancial system as a global common resource problem (Tucker, 2016a, 2017).
This is a modest vision of the social purpose of ﬁnancial stability regimes, with capital
requirements seen as the ﬁrst and primary line of defence, agreed internationally, and
adjusted according to ﬁscal track record and the ﬂexibility of labour and product mar-
kets (Tucker, 2016a). Moreover, it neglects important macroeconomic questions,
including a ‘too much ﬁnance thesis’, where crowding out and misallocation effects
impede growth (Arcand, Berkes, & Panizza, 2015; Cecchiti & Kharroubi, 2012, 2015;
Christensen, Shaxson, & Wigan, 2016; Epstein & Montecino, 2016). Macroprudential
policy’s potential role in guarding against these effects by reducing levels of harmful
ﬁnancial activity, has received little attention to date. While macroprudential’s macro-
social ontology potentially opened up space for a public debate about the social purpose
of ﬁnance and its regulation, there are signs that former regulatory professionals are
now moving into that normative void, ﬁlling it in a conservation fashion, in an effective
continuation of patterns of ‘club ﬁnancial governance’ (Tsingou, 2015).8
Conclusion
The concept of social purpose never entirely departed the ﬁeld of IPE. Nevertheless, it
has languished in a state of under use, implicit consideration and passing reference.
Financial reform since the ﬁnancial crisis and the task of interpreting that, do create an
impetus for scholars to redouble their efforts to develop understanding of the politics
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of social purpose, and to be more systematic and forensic in approaching this task. This
article argues that in ﬁnance, social purpose originates in and emerges from accounts of
economic and ﬁnancial systems or economic ontology. Macroprudential ontology, it
has been established, has the features of a macrosocial ontology, which brings within
reach the articulation of distinctive macro-moralities regarding systemic stabilisation,
systemic design and questions of the good system. By and large, these opportunities
have not been pursued. The politics of macroprudential social purpose has resided in a
knowledge–authority vacuum produced by epistemological, institutional and political
barriers. The broader signiﬁcance of this argument is that it identiﬁes a missing ingredi-
ent in academic writing about why ﬁnancial reform and macroprudential regime build-
ing has been relatively timid. Technical difﬁculties and reﬂexivity itself (Stellinga &
Mugge, 2017), neo-liberal governmentality involving a ﬁxation on risk at the expense
of uncertainty (Konings, 2016), the reinforcement of neo-liberal growth models (Casey,
2015,) principal-delegator’s desire for control through symbolic politics (Lombardi &
Moschella, 2017), and private sector resistance (Helleiner, 2014) have all been for-
warded. None, however, fully capture the emerging political economy of macropruden-
tial regulation. Likewise, scholar of the Minsky archive, Jan Kregel, has argued that the
problem with macroprudential regulation is that it has lacked a theory of dynamic
endogenous ﬁnancial instability to underpin it (Kregel, 2014). On the contrary, this
paper has argued that such a theory is identiﬁable in foundational macroprudential
ontology. The problem is not the lack of theory, but the failure to fully interrogate that
theory and the lack of actors willing and able to translate it into a sense of the overarch-
ing social purpose macroprudential policy regimes should serve. Normative agents in
the macroprudential policy ﬁeld are thin on the ground. The politics of social purpose
can help us to understand the obstacles to more ambitious forms of macroprudential
policy. In this respect, social purpose is a crucial missing ingredient in macroprudential
debates, both in policy terms, and in academic efforts to understand and interpret the
political economy of this emerging policy ﬁeld, and of post-crisis ﬁnancial reform more
generally.
Notes
1. Ruggie began the 1982 article with reference to looking for a black cat in a black room, while mak-
ing the case for an interpretative epistemology. The difﬁculties of studying social purpose, of iden-
tifying it, of studying its politics have possibly put scholars off, but this suggests that creating
ﬁrmer analytical foundations for the study of social purpose is warranted.
2. Ruggie referred to social purpose functioning through a ‘generative grammar’ of understanding
that gave content to international economic order and its systems of governance.
3. The main exception is the work of Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn who developed a neo-Gramscian
account of the social purpose of the European Single Market project (Van Apeldoorn, 2003).
4. Notable exceptions are to be found in the work of Best (2005, esp. Ch. 5), Widmaier (2016a, b),
Ban (2016) and Helgadottir (2016).
5. Seabrooke’s work emphasising the role of knowledge brokers that link professional ecologies does
not run contrary to this line of argument. One of the reasons knowledge brokers who span differ-
ent professional groups are of high potential inﬂuence is because of the segmented, compartmen-
talised and tightly delegated nature of contemporary knowledge production (Ban, Seabrooke, &
Freitas, 2017; Seabrooke, 2014; Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2009).
6. In 1966–1997, Minsky drafted a proposal for a new bank examination procedure for the Federal
Deposit Commission and drafted follow ups for the Federal Reserve (Kregel, 2014; Minsky, 1967).
7. Charles Goodhart notes that, while he ﬁnds Minsky ‘enormously attractive’, his ideas are difﬁcult
to model in a rigorous way (http://www.metropolis-verlag.de/Minsky-I-ﬁnd-enormously-attrac
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 311
tive-but-his-issues-are-very-difﬁcult-to-model-in-any-rigorous-way/13012/book.do). He and
other Geneva group authors engage with Minsky but do not pick up the hedge, speculative and
Ponzi distinctions.
8. NGOs are a possible countervailing force including one narrative that identiﬁes a ‘ﬁnance curse’
effect (see Baker & Wigan, 2017).
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